This means primarily that leaving the EU is genuinely a major regime change, with massive political, legal, economic and social consequences.
Being just outside the EU outer perimeter fence is not AT ALL similar to living just inside it. Which is where David Cameron sought to entrench the U.K. – outside political, monetary, banking, fiscal Union, outside Schengen, and with a pick and choose approach to what used to be the third pillar of justice and home affairs. His was the last attempt to amplify and entrench British exceptionalism WITHIN the EU legal order.
It failed. A majority voted to leave altogether
Once you leave the EU, you cannot, from just outside the fence, achieve all the benefits you got just inside it.
First, there will, under NO circumstances, be frictionless trade when outside the Single Market and Customs Union. Frictionless trade comes with free movement. And with the European Court of Justice.
Second, voluntary alignment from outside – even where that makes sense or is just inevitable – does NOT deliver all the benefits of membership. Because, unlike members you are not subject to the adjudication and enforcement machinery to which all members are.
And that’s what we wanted, right? British laws and British Courts.
Fine. But then market access into what is now their market, governed by supranational laws and Courts of which you are no longer part – and not, as it used to be, yours – is worse and more limited than before. That is unavoidable. It is not, vindictive, voluntary, a punishment beating, or any of the other nonsense we hear daily. It is just ineluctable reality.
Leaving the EU whilst continuing to trade with it, as our largest single trade partner means that we have effectively sacrificed real power and influence over how the EU sets the rules and regulations for the majority of our foreign trade, and in return we receive only nominal power over our own state.
The solidarity of the club members will ALWAYS be with each other, not with you. We have seen that over the backstop issue over the last 18 months which will pale into insignificance when it comes to the actual trade negotiations. wait till the trade negotiations.
The solidarity of the remaining Member States will be with the major fishing Member States, not with the U.K. The solidarity will be with Spain, not the U.K., when Madrid makes Gibraltar-related demands in the trade negotiation endgame. The solidarity will be with Cyprus when it says it wants to avoid precedents which might be applied to Turkey.
The EU is negotiating with us, not as a member, but as a prospective soon-to-be third country, a competitor on the global stage. We voted to become a third country and an opponent and rival, not just a partner, now. It is time to accept the consequences.
Parliament has descended into farce. The government has come up with a version of brexit that no one likes, neither those that voted to leave nor (obviously) those that voted to stay within the EU. Rather than put their proposal to a vote and lose, the government after four days of debate, decided to pull the vote, offending everyone and try to re-open discussions with the EU. We’re supposed to be leaving in March.
Not surprisingly, her own party called for a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister, Theresa May, which she then won by around 2:1. Not exactly a ringing endorsement, but considerably more than the margin in the referendum.
So here we are. The PM is set to attend an EU meeting today that may generate some kind of non-legally binding letter that states the intent of the EU is not to hold the UK forever hostage in a customs union (the great fear of the most strident leave campaigning MPs). Even if she manages to achieve this, it is unlikely to placate her own MPs who are so far to the extreme and lack such trust in the process that nothing will satisfy them.
Perhaps more importantly it will also likely fail to please the DUP, a small political party currently propping up her minority government, who quite rightly point out that legally it is entirely clear that the customs union will last forever (whatever intentions might be) for N Ireland unless the EU agrees otherwise, thus creating a border between N Ireland and the rest of the UK, taking one step too far towards a re-united Ireland.
So there will be some face saving letter written that will fail to please most of the MPs currently objecting to the government proposal which is now scheduled to be put before parliament after the Christmas break at the end of January.
I’m assuming that the PM is hoping that given a choice between a bad deal (her proposal) and no deal at all, most MPs will vote for her deal which is somewhat ironic given the much quoted “No deal is better than a bad deal” parroted for the first year of brexit by her government.
But with that legislation is an amendment put forward by one of the MPs that removes the automatic process whereby we would leave the EU with no deal whatsoever. This would then leave responsibility for directing the brexit negotiations back to parliament where there seems to be no consensus as yet, as to the best way forward. Unless…
The loyal opposition party, Labour are biding their time and hoping MPs will become so disgusted with the way things are going that they can call a vote of no confidence in the entire government and thus force a general election where they themselves might win.
This strategy has a couple of obvious flaws. Whatever their faults and internal arguments or ambitions, the members of the Conservative party will never vote down their own government. The DUP have stated that they will also not vote to overthrow the Tories so there just aren’t enough votes available now we have a fixed term parliament to force a general election.
It’s also worth noting that the country is sick of brexit and want the whole thing over with, or at least progressing. They don’t yet realise that we’re just at the start of the process, that the trade deal as such is going to take many more years to negotiate. Any attempt to derail the process or unseat the government at the moment may well be very unpopular with the electorate and lead to a defeat in a general election.
Most likely the proposal from the government will remain deeply unpopular and be voted down. The Grieve amendment taking “no deal” off the table will be popular and will pass.
Labour may call for a vote of no confidence in the government, but it will fail.
So what happens next? The quick answer is that no one knows.
The government could throw its hands in the air, decide that the whole process was unworkable and undesirable and unilaterally revoke the whole Art50 process. A recent ECJ ruling has confirmed that the UK could do this and remain within the EU on the terms it currently enjoys. but this seems a very unlikely outcome. As things stands it would run counter to the referendum result, undermining faith in government and parliament.
It is possible for the UK to apply to the EU for an extension to Art50, the process we are currently within that requires us to leave at the end of March 2019 but it would need the approval of each of the other 27 EU states. Permission would only be given if there was a clear reason such as the need to call a general election or to call for another referendum if the decision on next steps was given to the electorate.
And as we creep closer and closer to the March deadline, unless there emerges a clear consensus within parliament as to the best way forward, a second referendum seems more likely, tinged with the spectre of leaving with no deal at all and the chaos that would cause.
We are edging ever closer to the edge of the waterfall.
Last week the EU and UK published a draft divorce agreement. Nearly two-and-a-half years after the UK shocked their own government by voting to leave the EU, we are about to discover what Brexit actually means.
Ofcourse the deal still has to be agreed by the EU and, harder still, by UK Parliament. Several ministers, including the Brexit secretary, resigned in protest; Theresa May could yet be toppled. MPs must now grapple with multiple loyalties: to their constituents, their parties and their own beliefs, all of which are likely to have shifted since the referendum. Within weeks they will have to make the biggest decision facing Britain, and one of the biggest for Europe, in generations.
If the country has learned anything since 2016, it is to look before it leaps. Yet, in what well summed up the level of debate on Brexit, both hardline Leavers and Remainers alike trashed the deal before they had read a word of it. This makes no sense.
The terms of the divorce will take time for MPs and those they represent to digest—and they may well be amended by European leaders before Parliament has its vote. Nor is it clear what would happen in the event that the deal were voted down: more negotiating, a second referendum or crashing out without a deal? But as the crunch vote nears, mps must consider how to approach this fateful question.
First, we have to forget the past. The cheating that went on during the campaign, the premature triggering of Article 50 and the thin preparations are maddening. But they are questions for the inquiry that will surely one day dissect this national fiasco.
The task before Parliament is to decide in a cool-headed way whether adopting the terms on offer is better for the country than rejecting them.
Those who backed Remain—a group that includes most MPs—will find little in the deal to make them think they were wrong. Although it legally sets out only a temporary framework, its terms are clearly worse than the status quo.
Yet if they are to respect the referendum, MPs need also to judge the deal against what voters were promised during the referendum.
The Leave campaign had no formal manifesto, and most of those behind it have since fled the government but the animating idea was to “take back control”. In some ways the deal does this, notably in immigration, where Britain would reclaim the right to limit migration from Europe. The price of this is being kicked out of the single market, which would hit the economy. MPs must decide whether the government is right that the public accepts this trade-off.
But in other ways the UK will unequivocally forfeit control. It will stay aligned with many of the single market’s current and future rules, to keep trade flowing and the Irish border open, something the EU has made a condition of any deal.
Once outside the EU, the UK will have no say in setting these rules. European judges will still arbitrate on such matters, even though the UK will no longer be able to nominate them. This is not taking back control but giving it up.
Meanwhile, as long as it remains in a customs union Britain will not even get the consolation prize of signing trade deals with other countries, something by which many Brexiteers have come to set enormous (and unwarranted) store.
The deal also has implications for the integrity of the United Kingdom. It would keep open the Irish border, but create a deeper regulatory divide between Northern Ireland and mainland Britain. Whilst most English voters do not care much about Northern Ireland, MPs, particularly those from what is formally called the Conservative and Unionist Party, should ask themselves whether it is right that an accidental by-product of Brexit should be a step towards Irish unification.
Hanging over this debate about the pros and cons of the deal is the question of what overturning it would do to the health of Britain’s democracy. Parliament has the legal right to ignore the referendum. But after a record number of people voted (to “take back control”, no less), it could be catastrophic for trust in mainstream parties if it were to do so.
The democratic argument is complicated. The vote to leave was an expression not just of Euroscepticism but of a wider frustration. It exposed divisions by age, region and class that the old left-right party divide had covered up. Far from bridging those divides, the bitter arguments since the referendum have if anything caused the two sides to move even further apart.
Overturning the vote would risk making them irreconcilable but adopting a Brexit deal like the one on offer would be unlikely to heal those wounds. Indeed, if the referendum was a howl by the left-behind against rule by remote and uncaring elites, this form of Brexit could make those problems worse. Anger at unaccountable rulers would not be assuaged by a deal in which Britain followed orders from people it could not elect. And those keen just to get the whole thing over with might find that Brexit marked only the beginning of national argument about the relationship with the behemoth next door.
Nor is it clear that the democratic thing to do is to hold people to the result of a two-year-old, narrowly won referendum, when the consequence of the vote has turned out to be quite different from what many voters expected. Polls suggest that a small majority now prefers Remain to Leave; more might prefer Remain to a compromise like the deal on offer. Almost all MPs want to respect the will of the people. The question is whether the people’s will found its perfect and enduring expression in 2016, or whether it might have changed.
There is no simple way out of this endgame. Whether the Brexit deal is accepted or rejected, it will scar Britain for years. Too many politicians are still grandstanding. Some Brexiteers still pretend there is a Planb that would deliver a painless exit.
Labour is mainly concerned with forcing a general election.
That needs to change, and fast. This decision must be made in the most reasoned way possible and with the maximum information available. Politicians of all stripes have spent the past two years talking about the national interest. In the coming weeks they must weigh up where they think it lies.
Unsurprisingly, most of the people I know are fundamentally opposed to leaving the EU. However we’ve all had a couple of years now to get used to the idea that we’re leaving and bound for disappointment.
Looking through the more right-wing media outlets what is perhaps most striking is how disappointed people who voted to leave find themselves.
We’re leaving in March 2019, and no one is happy.
But looking around the political landscape, there is a total lack of alternative directions to be found. And there is something of a lack of ideas for what happens once we’ve left.
Part of the problem is the all-encompassing nature of the brexit negotiations which just suck up all of the political air, leaving none for discussing real-life politics.
Beneath the chaos of the Brexit talks, big ideas are forming that will shape the next decade. At last there are signs that politicians are starting to think about the direction that Britain should take after it leaves the EU.
Some of the fundamental ideas that have underpinned Western governments of all stripes for decades are being questioned from right and left. A party which could come up with persuasive answers might dominate British politics for many years.
The people have spoken
The Leave campaign’s demand to “take back control” resonated because it applied to more than just Britain’s relationship with Europe. It chimed with those sick of a hyper-centralised state, where feeble councils take marching orders from an out-of-touch London. It tapped into growing anger at the outsourcing of public services to remote and incompetent private companies. It pointed to the firms that bypass employment law by treating staff as “gig” workers with few rights. And it reflected a feeling of impotence in the face of a system of global capitalism which, ten years ago, sent Britain into recession after bankers thousands of miles away mis-sold securities that no one, including themselves, understood.
On becoming prime minister in 2016, Theresa May assured voters that she had heard their cry, and boldly vowed to reshape “the forces of liberalism and globalisation which have held sway…across the Western world.” She has not kept this promise. Her lack of imagination, squandered majority and the all-consuming Brexit negotiations—the ones with her party, rather than the EU—mean that, more than two years on from their great howl, the British people have seen nothing in return.
When Brexit day comes next March, and Britain is left with either a bad deal or with no deal at all, the call for revolutionary change will not have been sated—it will be stronger than ever.
Meanwhile the Labour Party is marching ever further and more confidently to the left. Many of the ideas in its manifesto last year recast old policies, such as renationalising the railways, which would not answer the fundamental new questions being asked of the state. But since then Labour’s economic plan has evolved. The shadow chancellor, John McDonnell now proposes “the greatest extension of economic democratic rights that this country has ever seen”.
McDonnell correctly identifies that power has drained from labour towards capital in recent years. But his proposals to redress this balance would see the state strong-arm its way deeply into the economy.
Companies would have to nominate workers to make up a third of their boards, while pay would be determined by collective bargaining. 10% of companies’ equity would be expropriated and put in funds managed by workers’ representatives, that would become the largest shareholders in many of the biggest firms.
Workers would receive some dividends, but the majority would go to the government.
The Treasury would be “reprogrammed” to channel money to favoured industries despite the history that shows us government is lousy at picking industrial “winners”
Coupled with a plan to raise the minimum wage so that it embraces 60% of employees under 25, the package represents a transfer of power not just to workers but also to the state and the unions.
It all feels a bit too “big state” for my taste.
“The greater the mess we inherit, the more radical we have to be,” Mr McDonnell told the conference. Brexit is likely to provide the mess required to justify a socialist shock-doctrine.
The Tories have been slower to regroup. Some want to dust off the free-market principles of Thatcherism and apply them to new areas, lifting planning restrictions to encourage housebuilding, say. Others want the party to blunt capitalism’s sharper edges, for instance by mimicking the trust-busting of Teddy Roosevelt, whose target today would be the overmighty, rent-seeking tech monopolies. Still others believe the remedy for Britain’s fractiousness is to update Benjamin Disraeli’s “One Nation” Conservatism, arguing that its modern mission should be to unite a country whose deep divides—by age, class, region and more—were exposed by Brexit.
These ideas could mark a dramatic break with the past.
But whereas an insurgent Labour has united behind a growing list of detailed plans, the Tories’ thoughts are ill-defined, and the party far from agreed on which to pursue. Their leader, on the rack in Brussels and fighting for her job in Westminster, has no time for philosophising. She is unlikely to make way for a successor until Britain has left the EU. Yet there is no time to lose.
Too many Tories doubt that plans as drastic as Mr McDonnell’s could ever be enacted in Britain. That is complacent. The grotesque folly of Brexit will be enough to persuade many wealthy Britons to ditch the Tories, even if it means electing a far-left chancellor. And Britain’s winner-takes-all system lets governments quickly and dramatically reshape the country. Mr McDonnell would not face the checks and balances that have restrained President Donald Trump.
Britain is at last getting the battle of ideas that the referendum result demanded. That presents big opportunities, but also grave risks. It is time for those who dislike the sound of the future described by Labour this week to do some hard thinking of their own.
Voted Labour all of my life but cannot imagine myself voting for the current leadership.
I have friends (Jewish) who genuinely feel that they will be threatened if the current Labour leadership comes to power. They feel their citizenship will be questioned, violence against them will increase and be tolerated (not just the verbal kind) and that one way or another they will be encouraged to leave.
If you’re not Jewish, it can sound absurd, but then you pause and remember the Windrush scandal where British citizens, people who have lived here legally, all or most of their lives, were literally rounded up and deported within the last decade.
And then you think about the millions of EU citizens being held hostage to the current brexit negotiations and the hostile immigration policies being implemented to encourage people to leave.
And you see the rampant anti-semitism expressed on line and in the Labour Party where Jewish MPs are routinely harassed and threatened, where they require bodyguards to attend their own political conferences.
I’m not Jewish. It’s a religion with a tiny minority in the UK, and mostly people just don’t recognise the problem because they personally don’t have to deal with it. But an intolerant society doesn’t stop with just one religion, just one minority group.
And if we tolerate racism against one group, where does it ever stop.
At some level, Corbyn may or may not be anti-semitic himself. Either he is, or he is so incompetent a leader that he can’t seem to stamp it out amongst his own supporters.
Is that the choice: an anti-semite or an incompetent? Because at this moment in time, I can’t vote for either.
One of the key features of brexit campaigning was restricting or controlling immigration, so it’s worth reading the recent report on immigration from the UK’s Migration Advisory Committee. Many EU countries interpret the principle rather more loosely than Britain ever has and so there is considerable room for a fudge to develop.
It advises Theresa May’s government that Britain should not offer EU citizens preferential terms after it leaves. Yet it pointedly adds that “preferential access to the UK labour market would be of benefit to EU citizens”. This clearly hints that a regime favouring EU migrants could be a bargaining chip to win better access to the EU’s single market.
The principle of getting free trade in return for free movement is implicit in the single market’s rules. As a matter of economics, a single market could be built around the free movement of goods, services and capital. But the EU deliberately adds free movement of people, which most citizens outside Britain see as a benefit of the club.
Yet it also permits exceptions and other EU countries have long been amazed that, given Britain’s hostility to EU migration, its government has never applied the constraints allowed on free movement. It was one of only three countries not to limit the migration of nationals from central and eastern European countries for the first few years after they joined the EU in 2004. Even today it is more generous than it needs to be. In June Britain chose not to extend limits on free movement from Croatia, which joined the EU in 2013, for two more years.
Britain is also in a minority in having no registration system for EU migrants. Post-Brexit, it could use such a system, as Belgium does, to throw out migrants who have no job after six months. Denmark and Austria limit migrants’ ability to buy homes in some places.
Most EU countries are also tougher than Britain in insisting that welfare benefits cannot be claimed until a migrant builds up some years’ worth of contributions. Equally, the EU’s posted-workers directive is used by many to try to stop any undercutting of local labour markets.
Britain is lax in enforcing both its minimum wage and its standards for working conditions.
Non-EU countries in the European Economic Area have other options. Liechtenstein, a tiny principality, has quotas on EU migrants, despite being a full member of the single market. Article 112 of the EEA treaty allows Iceland and Norway to invoke an “emergency brake”, although they have never used it. And non-EEA Switzerland, which is in the single market for goods, not only limits property purchases but also makes most employers offer jobs to Swiss nationals first.
This particular concession was secured after the EU refused to accept a Swiss vote in 2014 to set limits on free movement. Yet a further referendum on the issue is now threatened, so Brussels may have to bend its rules yet again. All this comes as other EU countries besides Britain are looking for new ways to constrain the free movement of people.
The MAC report itself points to the irony that all this is happening as EU migration to Britain is going down fast. It notes that the country may be ending free movement just as public concern about it is falling. It is not too late for a compromise in which Britain accepts something like free movement in principle, but heavily constrains it in practice.
Though of course it might be too late.
Control works both ways and more and more EU citizens are deciding to leave the UK, finding it increasingly expensive thanks to its falling exchange rate and increasingly unwelcoming thanks to its anti-immigration rhetoric. This is also true for non-EU immigrants.
Maybe the greatest irony will turn out to be that immigrants reject the UK.
Liberals contend that societies can change gradually for the better and from the bottom up. They differ from revolutionaries because they reject the idea that individuals should be coerced into accepting someone else’s beliefs. They differ from conservatives because they assert that aristocracy and hierarchy, indeed all concentrations of power, tend to become sources of oppression.
Liberalism thus begins as a restless, agitating world view. Yet over the past few decades liberals have become too comfortable with power. As a result, they have lost their hunger for reform. The ruling liberal elite tell themselves that they preside over a healthy meritocracy and that they have earned their privileges. The reality is not so clear-cut.
At its best, the competitive spirit of meritocracy has created extraordinary prosperity and a wealth of new ideas. In the name of efficiency and economic freedom, governments have opened up markets to competition. Race, gender and sexuality have never been less of a barrier to advancement. Globalisation has lifted hundreds of millions of people in emerging markets out of poverty. It could be so much better, but it has also been so very much worse.
But ruling liberals have often sheltered themselves from the gales of creative destruction. Cushy professions such as law are protected by fatuous regulations. Financiers were spared the worst of the financial crisis when their employers were bailed out with taxpayers’ money. Globalisation was meant to create enough gains to help the losers, but too few of them have seen the pay-off.
In all sorts of ways, the liberal meritocracy is closed and self-sustaining. Liberal technocrats contrive endless clever policy fixes, but they remain conspicuously aloof from the people they are supposed to be helping. This creates two classes: the doers and the done-to, the thinkers and the thought-for, the policymakers and the policytakers.
The founding idea of liberals is civic respect for all, set outing the Economist centenary editorial, written in 1943 as the war against fascism raged, t in two complementary principles. The first is freedom: that it is “not only just and wise but also profitable…to let people do what they want.” The second is the common interest: that “human society…can be an association for the welfare of all.”
Today’s liberal meritocracy sits uncomfortably with that inclusive definition of freedom. We live in bubbles. Remote from power, most people are expected to be content with growing material prosperity instead. Yet, amid stagnating productivity and the fiscal austerity that followed the financial crisis of 2008, even this promise has often been broken.
That is one reason loyalty to mainstream parties is corroding. Britain’s Conservatives, perhaps the most successful party in history, now raise more money from the wills of dead people than they do from the gifts of the living..
People are retreating into group identities defined by race, religion or sexuality. As a result, that second principle, the common interest, has fragmented. Leaders on the right, in particular, exploit the insecurity engendered by immigration as a way of whipping up support. And they use smug left-wing arguments about political correctness to feed their voters’ sense of being looked down on. The result is polarisation. Sometimes that leads to paralysis, sometimes to the tyranny of the majority.
At worst it emboldens far-right authoritarians.
Liberals are losing the argument in geopolitics, as well. Liberalism spread in the 19th and 20th centuries against the backdrop first of British naval hegemony and, later, the economic and military rise of the United States. Today, by contrast, the retreat of liberal democracy is taking place as Russia plays the saboteur and China asserts its growing global power.
This impulse to pull back is based on a misconception. As the historian Robert Kagan points out, America did not switch from interwar isolationism to post-war engagement in order to contain the Soviet Union, as is often assumed. Instead, having seen how the chaos of the 1920s and 1930s bred fascism and Bolshevism, its post-war statesmen concluded that a leaderless world was a threat. In the words of Dean Acheson, a secretary of state, America could no longer sit “in the parlour with a loaded shotgun, waiting”.
Even if today’s peace holds, liberalism will suffer as growing fears of foreign foes drive people into the arms of strongmen and populists.
It is the moment for a liberal reinvention. Liberals need to spend less time dismissing their critics as fools and bigots and more fixing what is wrong. Liberals need to side with a struggling precariat against the patricians.
Liberals should approach today’s challenges with vigour. If they prevail, it will be because their ideas are unmatched for their ability to spread freedom and prosperity
They must rediscover their belief in individual dignity and self-reliance—by curbing their own privileges. They must stop sneering at nationalism, but claim it for themselves and fill it with their own brand of inclusive civic pride. Rather than lodging power in centralised ministries and unaccountable technocracies, they should devolve it to regions and municipalities. Instead of treating geopolitics as a zero-sum struggle between the great powers, America must draw on the self-reinforcing triad of its military might, its values and its allies.
The best liberals have always been pragmatic and adaptable. Before the first world war Theodore Roosevelt took on the robber barons who ran America’s great monopolies. Although many early liberals feared mob rule, they embraced democracy. After the Depression in the 1930s they acknowledged that government has a limited role in managing the economy. Partly in order to see off fascism and communism after the second world war, liberals designed the welfare state.
Liberals should approach today’s challenges with equal vigour. If they prevail, it will be because their ideas are unmatched for their ability to spread freedom and prosperity. Liberals should embrace criticism and welcome debate as a source of the new thinking that will rekindle their movement. They should be bold and impatient for reform. Young people, especially, have a world to claim.
The lonely are not just sadder; they are unhealthier and die younger. What can be done?
Policymakers in the rich world are increasingly worried about loneliness. Campaigns to reduce it have been launched in Britain, Denmark and Australia. In Japan the government has surveyed hikikomori, or “people who shut themselves in their homes”. Last year Vivek Murthy, a former surgeon-general of the United States, called loneliness an epidemic, likening its impact on health to obesity or smoking 15 cigarettes per day. In January Theresa May, the British prime minister, appointed a minister for loneliness.
That the problem exists is obvious; its nature and extent are not. Researchers start by distinguishing several related conditions. Loneliness is not synonymous with social isolation (how often a person meets or speaks to friends and family) or with solitude (which implies a choice to be alone).
Instead researchers define loneliness as perceived social isolation, a feeling of not having the social contacts one would like. Of course, the objectively isolated are much more likely than the average person to feel lonely. But loneliness can also strike those with seemingly ample friends and family. Nor is loneliness always a bad thing. John Cacioppo, an American psychologist who died in March, called it a reflex honed by natural selection. Early humans would have been at a disadvantage if isolated from a group, he noted, so it makes sense for loneliness to stir a desire for company. Transient loneliness still serves that purpose today. The problem comes when it is prolonged.
To find out how many people feel this way, The Economist and the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF), an American non-profit group focused on health, surveyed nationally representative samples of people in three rich countries*. The study found that 9% of adults in Japan, 22% in America and 23% in Britain always or often feel lonely, or lack companionship, or else feel left out or isolated.
Almost 1 in 4 people in the UK feel lonely
The findings complement academic research which uses standardised questionnaires to measure loneliness. One drawn up at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), has 20 statements, such as “I have nobody to talk to”, and “I find myself waiting for people to call or write”. Responses are marked based on the extent to which people agree. Respondents with tallies above a threshold are classed as lonely.
A study published in 2010 using this scale estimated that 35% of Americans over 45 were lonely. Of these 45% had felt this way for at least six years; a further 32% for one to five years. In 2013 Britain’s Office for National Statistics (ONS), by dint of asking a simple question, classed 25% of people aged 52 or over as “sometimes lonely” with an extra 9% “often lonely”.
Other evidence points to the extent of isolation. For 41% of Britons over 65, TV or a pet is their main source of company, according to Age UK, a charity. In Japan more than half a million people stay at home for at least six months at a time, making no contact with the outside world, according to a report by the government in 2016. Another government study reckons that 15% of Japanese regularly eat alone. A popular TV show is called “The Solitary Gourmet”.
Historical data about loneliness are scant. But isolation does seem to be increasing, so loneliness may be too. Consider the rise in solitary living. Before 1960 the share of solo households in America, Europe or Japan rarely rose above 10%. Today in cities such as Stockholm most households have just one member. Many people opt to live alone, as a mark of independence. But there are also many in rich countries who live solo because of, say, divorce or a spouse’s death.
Isolation is increasing in other ways, too. From 1985 to 2009 the average size of an American’s social network—defined by number of confidants—declined by more than one-third. Other studies suggest that fewer Americans join in social communities like church groups or sports teams.
The idea that loneliness is bad for your health is not new. One early job of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in the Yukon region was to keep tabs on the well-being of gold prospectors who might go months without human contact. Evidence points to the benign power of a social life. Suicides fall during football World Cups, for example, maybe because of the transient feeling of community.
But only recently has medicine studied the links between relationships and health. In 2015 a meta-analysis led by Julianne Holt-Lunstad of Brigham Young University, in Utah, synthesised 70 papers, through which 3.4m participants were followed over an average of seven years. She found that those classed as lonely had a 26% higher risk of dying, and those living alone a 32% higher chance, after accounting for differences in age and health status.
Smaller-scale studies have found correlations between loneliness and isolation, and a range of health problems, including heart attacks, strokes, cancers, eating disorders, drug abuse, sleep deprivation, depression, alcoholism and anxiety. Some research suggests that the lonely are more likely to suffer from cognitive decline and a quicker progress of Alzheimer’s disease.
Researchers have three theories as to how loneliness may lead to ill health, says Nicole Valtorta of Newcastle University. The first covers behaviour. Lacking encouragement from family or friends, the lonely may slide into unhealthy habits. The second is biological. Loneliness may raise levels of stress, say, or impede sleep, and in turn harm the body. The third is psychological, since loneliness can augment depression or anxiety.
Or is it the other way round? Maybe sick people are more likely to be lonely. In the KFF/Economist survey six out of ten people who said they were lonely or socially isolated blamed specific causes such as poor mental or physical health. Three out of ten said their loneliness had made them think about harming themselves. Research led by Marko Elovainio of the University of Helsinki and colleagues, using the UK Biobank, a voluntary database of hundreds of thousands of people, suggests that the relationship runs both ways: loneliness leads to ill health, and vice versa.
Other studies show more about the causes of loneliness. A common theme is the lack of a partner. Analysis of the survey data found that married or cohabiting people were far less lonely. Having a partner seems especially important for older people, as generally they have fewer (but often closer) relationships than the young do.
Yet loneliness is not especially a phenomenon of the elderly. The polling found no clear link between age and loneliness in America or Britain—and in Japan younger people were in fact lonelier. Young adults, and the very old (over-85s, say) tend to have the highest shares of lonely people of any adult age-group. Other research suggests that, among the elderly, loneliness tends to have a specific cause, such as widowhood. In the young it is generally down to a gap in expectations between relationships they have and those they want.
Whatever their age, some groups are much more likely to be lonely. One is people with disabilities. Migrants are another. A study of Polish immigrants in the Netherlands published in 2017 found that they reported much higher rates of loneliness than Dutch-born people aged between 60 and 79 (though female migrants tended to cope better than their male peers). A survey by a Chinese trade union in 2010 concluded that “the defining aspect of the migrant experience” is loneliness.
Regions left behind by migrants, such as rural China, often have higher rates of loneliness, too. A study of older people in Anhui province in eastern China published in 2011 found that 78% reported “moderate to severe levels of loneliness”, often as a result of younger relatives having moved. Similar trends are found in eastern Europe where younger people have left to find work elsewhere.
Loneliness is usually best explained as the result of individual factors such as disability, depression, widowhood or leaving home without your partner. Yet some commentators say larger forces, such as “neoliberalism”, are at work.
In fact, it is hard to prove that an abstract noun is creating a feeling. And research on rates of reported loneliness does not support the view that rich, individualistic societies are lonelier than others. A study published in 2015 by Thomas Hansen and Britt Slagvold of Oslo Metropolitan University, for example, found that “quite severe” loneliness ranged from 30-55% in southern and eastern Europe, versus 10-20% in western and northern Europe. “It is thus a paradox that older people are less lonely in more individualistic and less familistic cultures,” concluded the authors.
Their research pointed to two explanations. The most important is that southern and eastern European countries are generally poorer, with patchier welfare states. The second reason concerns culture. The authors argued that in countries where older people expect to live near and be cared for by younger relatives, the shock when that does not happen is greater.
Another villain in the contemporary debate is technology. Smartphones and social media are blamed for a rise in loneliness in young people. This is plausible. Data from the OECD club of mostly rich countries suggest that in nearly every member country the share of 15-year-olds saying that they feel lonely at school rose between 2003 and 2015.
The smartphone makes an easy scapegoat. A sharp drop in how often American teenagers go out without their parents began in 2009, around when mobile phones became ubiquitous. Rather than meet up as often in person, so the story goes, young people are connecting online.
But this need not make them lonelier. Snapchat and Instagram may help them feel more connected with friends. Of those who said they felt lonely in the KFF/Economist survey, roughly as many found social media helpful as thought it made them feel worse. Yet some psychologists say that scrolling through others’ carefully curated photos can make people feel they are missing out, and lonely. In a study of Americans aged 19 to 32, published in 2017, Brian Primack of the University of Pittsburgh, and colleagues, found that the quartile that used social media most often was more than twice as likely to report loneliness as the one using it least.
It is not clear whether it is heavy social-media use leading to loneliness, or vice versa. Other research shows that the correlation between social-media use and, say, depression is weak. The most rigorous recent study of British adolescents’ social-media use, published by Andrew Przybylski and Netta Weinstein in 2017, found no link between “moderate” use and measures of well-being. They found evidence to support their “digital Goldilocks hypothesis”: neither too little nor too much screen time is probably best.
Others are sure that technology can reduce loneliness. On the top of a hill in Gjøvik, a two-hour train-ride from Oslo, lives Per Rolid, an 85-year-old widowed farmer. One daughter lives nearby, but he admits feeling lonely. So he has agreed to take part in a trial of Komp, a device made by No Isolation, a startup founded in 2015. It consists of a basic computer screen, a bit like an etch-a-sketch. The screen rotates pictures sent by his grandchildren, and messages in large print from them and other kin.
No Isolation also makes AV1, a fetching robot in the form of a disembodied white head with cameras in its eye-sockets. It allows users, often out-of-school children with chronic diseases, to feel as if they are present in class. AV1 can be put on a desk so absent children can follow goings-on. If they want to ask a question, they can press a button on the AV1 app and the top of the robot’s head lights up.
So-called “social robots”, such as Paro, a cuddly robotic seal, have been used in Japan for some time. But they are becoming more sophisticated. Pepper, a human-ish robot made by a subsidiary of SoftBank, a Japanese conglomerate, can follow a person’s gaze and adapt its behaviour in response to humans. Last year the council in Southend, an English seaside town, began deploying Pepper in care homes.
Other health-care providers are experimenting with virtual reality (VR). In America UCHealth is conducting trials of VR therapy that allow some cancer patients to have “bucket list” experiences, such as skiing in Colorado. In 2016, Liminal, an Australian VR firm, teamed up with Medibank, an insurance company, to build a virtual experience for lonely people who could not leave their hospital beds.
As technology becomes more human it may be able to do more and more to substitute for human relationships. In the meantime, services that offer human contact to the lonely will thrive. In Japan this manifests itself in agencies and apps that allow you to rent a family or a friend—a girlfriend for a singleton, a funeral mourner, or simply a companion to watch TV with.
Such products are not just Japanese quirks. One Caring Team, an American company, calls and checks in on lonely elderly relatives for a monthly fee. The Silver Line, a similar (but free) helpline, is run by a British charity. Launched in 2013 it takes nearly 500,000 calls a year. Its staff in their Blackpool headquarters are supported by volunteers across the country in the Silver Friend service, a regular, pre-arranged call between a volunteer and an old person.
Most conversations last about 15 minutes. Those contacting the helpline during your correspondent’s visit started on a general topic—the weather, pets, what they did that morning. Their real reason for calling only emerged later, through an offhand comment. Often that referred to the need for a partner and the companionship that would bring. Others call in but barely talk, noted one Silver Line staff member.
For many, phone calls are no substitute for company. Nesterly, founded in 2016, is designed to make it easier for older singletons with spare rooms to rent them to young people who help in the house for a discount on rent. The platform has “stumbled into loneliness”, notes Noelle Marcus, its co-founder. Users sign up to the platform and create a profile, then make a listing for their room. Last year the startup teamed up with the city of Boston, Massachusetts, to test the initiative across the city.
Similar schemes are run by Homeshare, a network of charities, operating in 16 countries, including Britain. Elsewhere policymakers are experimenting with incentives to encourage old and young to mix. In cities such as Lyon in France, Deventer in the Netherlands and Cleveland in Ohio, nursing homes or local authorities are offering students free or cheap rent in exchange for helping out with housework.
That so many startups want to “disrupt” loneliness helps. But most of the burden will be shouldered by health systems. Some firms are trying to tackle the problem at root. Last year CareMore, an American health-care provider owned by Anthem, an insurer, launched a dedicated scheme. “We’re trying to reframe loneliness as a treatable medical condition,” explains Sachin Jain, its president.
This means, first, screening its 150,000 patients for loneliness. Those at risk are asked if they want to enroll in a “Togetherness Programme”. This involves phone calls from staff called “connectors” who help with transport to events and ideas for socialising. Patients are coaxed to visit clinics, even when not urgently ill, to play games, attend a “seniors’ gym” and just chat.
For its part, England’s National Health Service is increasingly using “social prescribing”, sending patients to social activities rather than giving them drugs. More than 100 such programmes are running in Britain. Yet last year a review of 15 papers concluded that evidence to date was too weak to support any conclusions about the programmes’ effectiveness. This reflects poorly on the state of thinking about loneliness.
There are plenty of reasons to take the effects of loneliness on health seriously. But the quality of evidence about which remedies work is woeful. Sadly, therefore, loneliness is set to remain a subject that causes a huge amount of angst without much relief.
I live in a mongrel nation. The more a person born in the UK claims “pure” blood, the more certain their heritage seems to be a total mish-mash of this and that. We are a country that has seen wave after wave of immigration, each and everyone of them adding something to what it means to be British.
Yet as brexit shows, we are a country that doesn’t much like immigrants.
I live in a country that dislikes, despises and begrudges immigrants their place in this country, whilst living in a part of that country with a high proportion of immigrants that seems to cope just fine. In fact the greatest irony of all seems to be that areas with high immigration value their immigrants best where as areas of low immigration are fearful of all and any changes that newcomers might bring.
Perhaps it isn’t surprising: I was brought up in a village with barely three surnames to rub together. Everyone was related in a byzantine set of connections, cousins to the right and left of me, with long memories for grudges. At his funeral, my father who had lived in the village since the age of five was still described decades later as that Scots boy who came down and married our girl.
But there is something more at play than simple parochial fear of the stranger. Facts show that immigration is economically good for the country accepting immigrants, good for the host society in many and varied ways, so why don’t we believe those facts?
The act of moving from a poor country to a rich one makes workers dramatically more productive. A world with more migration would be substantially richer. The snag is that the biggest benefits of moving accrue to the migrants themselves, while the power to admit them rests with voters in rich countries. Democratic accountability is vested largely in national governments. Yet most Western countries, struggling with ageing populations and shrinking workforces, need more migrants. So they have to find ways to make migration policy work for everyone.
The first step is to recognise the causes of the dislike of newcomers.
Several stand out: the belief that governments have lost control of their borders; the fear that migrants drain already-strained welfare systems; the perception that migrants are undercutting local workers; and the fear of being swamped by alien cultures.
Assuaging these concerns and fears requires both toughness and imagination. Start by regaining control. Overhaul the outdated international systems for aiding refugees; at the same time, open routes for well-regulated economic migration to the West. This will require countries to secure borders and enforce laws: by preventing the hiring of illegal immigrants and deporting those denied asylum, for example.
Where they do not exist, the introduction of ID cards can help. Maybe it’s time of the UK to bite the bullet on this topic.
Second, encourage all migrants, including refugees, to work, while limiting the welfare benefits that they can receive. In America, where the safety net is skimpy, labour rules are flexible and entry-level jobs plentiful, even migrants who dropped out of high school are net contributors to the public finances. Sweden, by contrast has a policy that seems designed to stir resentment, showering refugees with benefits while making it hard for them to work. Turkey does a better job at integrating refugees, even if it does not recognise them as such.
A sensible approach would be to allow migrants to get public education and health care immediately, but limit their access to welfare benefits for several years. This may seem discriminatory, but migrants will still be better off than if they had stayed at home. An extreme illustration can be seen in the oil-rich Gulf, where migrants are ruthlessly excluded from the opulent welfare that citizens enjoy. The Gulf is not a model. Migrant workers receive too little protection against coercion and abuse. But because they so obviously pay their way, the native-born are happy to admit them in vast numbers. Elements of that logic are worth considering in the West.
Third, ensure that the gains from migration are more explicitly shared between migrants and the native-born in the host country. One way is to tie public spending, particularly on visible services such as schools or hospitals, more directly to the number of migrants in a region. Another, more radical idea might be to tax migrants themselves, either by charging for entry or, more plausibly, by applying a surtax on their income for a period after arrival. The proceeds could be spent on public infrastructure, or simply divided among citizens.
Sex is a funny business. It has become a hyper-efficient and deregulated marketplace, and, like any hyper-efficient and deregulated marketplace, it often makes people feel very bad.
Our newest sex technologies, such as Tinder and Grindr, are built to carefully match people by looks above all else. Sexual value continues to accrue to abled over disabled, cis over trans, thin over fat, tall over short, white over nonwhite, rich over poor.
There is an absurd mismatch in the way that straight men and women are taught to respond to these circumstances. Women are socialized from childhood to blame themselves if they feel undesirable, to believe that they will be unacceptable unless they spend time and money and mental effort being pretty and amenable and appealing to men. Conventional femininity teaches women to be good partners to men as a basic moral requirement: a woman should provide her man a support system, and be an ideal accessory for him, and it is her job to convince him, and the world, that she is good.
They do no blame themselves for the things they say or do, or fail to say or fail to do. They do not blame the very narrow definitions available to them of male success in our society today.
And, as women gain the economic and cultural power that allows them to be choosy about their partners, men have generated ideas about self-improvement that are sometimes inextricable from violent rage.
A subset of straight men calling themselves “incels” have constructed a violent political ideology around the injustice of young, beautiful women refusing to have sex with them. These men often subscribe to notions of white supremacy. They are, by their own judgment, mostly unattractive and socially inept. (They frequently call themselves “subhuman.”) They’re also diabolically misogynistic.
“Society has become a place for worship of females and it’s so fucking wrong, they’re not Gods they are just a fucking cum-dumpster,” a typical rant on an incel message board reads. The idea that this misogyny is the real root of their failures with women does not appear to have occurred to them.
The incel ideology has already inspired the murders of at least sixteen people. Elliot Rodger, in 2014, in Isla Vista, California, killed six and injured fourteen in an attempt to instigate a “War on Women” for “depriving me of sex.” (He then killed himself.) Alek Minassian killed ten people and injured sixteen, in Toronto, last month; prior to doing so, he wrote, on Facebook, “The Incel Rebellion has already begun!” You might also include Christopher Harper-Mercer, who killed nine people, in 2015, and left behind a manifesto that praised Rodger and lamented his own virginity.
Incel stands for “involuntarily celibate,” but there are many people who would like to have sex and do not. (The term was coined by a queer Canadian woman, in the nineties.) Incels aren’t really looking for sex; they’re looking for absolute male supremacy. Sex, defined to them as dominion over female bodies, is just their preferred sort of proof.
What incels want is extremely limited and specific: they want unattractive, uncouth, and unpleasant misogynists to be able to have sex on demand with young, beautiful women. They believe that this is a natural right.
It is men, not women, who have shaped the contours of the incel predicament. It is male power, not female power, that has chained all of human society to the idea that women are decorative sexual objects, and that male worth is measured by how good-looking a woman they acquire. Women—and, specifically, feminists—are the architects of the body-positivity movement, the ones who have pushed for an expansive redefinition of what we consider attractive. “Feminism, far from being Rodger’s enemy,” Srinivasan wrote, “may well be the primary force resisting the very system that made him feel—as a short, clumsy, effeminate, interracial boy—inadequate.” Women, and L.G.B.T.Q. people, are the activists trying to make sex work legal and safe, to establish alternative arrangements of power and exchange in the sexual market.
All about me!
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